To what extent was Enoch Powell an asset to the Conservative Party in the years 1965-1976?
During his time as a Member of Parliament, Enoch Powell made numerous influences to both the success and hindrance of the Conservative Party from 1965 to 1976, which can be categorised into four main political areas.
The first is Powell’s policies, and the question of whether or not these contradicted Conservatism during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. As he explained at an interview in 1991, there were two subjects which “he exercised his liberty of self-expression most audibly”; his view of immigration into the UK, and Britain’s integration with Europe into the European Common Market (EEC). Both of these not only created mass publicity, but also gained (and lost) support for the Conservative party.
Firstly, looking at his view on immigration, Powell was concerned about the number of post-war immigrants entering the UK, and he publicised this concern whilst speaking in Birmingham on April 12th 1968. He spoke of how British society was suffering under the huge influx of immigrants it was accepting every year, and how this was damaging the basic character of Britain in the future:
“If all immigration ended tomorrow, the rate of growth of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population…would still leave the basic character of the national danger unaffected”.
Powell also spoke of the consequences Britain would face if it continued to allow such a high number of migrants passed its borders (which was over 50,000 a year in 1968). He predicted ethnic communities within the UK using violence against their fellow citizens, which would inevitably result in the break-down of British society:
“[The immigrant communities] will organise to consolidate their members”…“agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens”, and finally “dominate the rest with legal weapons…like the Roman, I see the River Tiber foaming with much blood”.
Because of the imagery Powell used here, his speech later became known as the “Rivers of blood” speech.
Powell’s second view was of Britain entering the European Economic Community. In 1970, when parliament had approved of Britain’s entry into this, Powell spoke out in the House of Commons, firmly believing that Britain should not be apart of any other economic system other than its own. He felt that by uniting under a European Union, there was little point in having the British parliamentary system, and furthermore, it undermined the historical liberties of Britain. If Britain were to be controlled under Europe, where would the sense of patriotism be? (As Powell later said in 1971: “there is more to politics than getting the economy right”…implying that nationhood was far more important than creating a monetary union with Europe).
But even though these were Powell’s policies, both vary on how much they contradicted Conservatism in this period. By looking at the Conservative manifesto of 1968 for instance, we can see that Powell’s view towards Europe did undermine Conservative policy at this time, as it claimed the Conservatives would:
“work energetically for entry into the European Common Market at the first favourable opportunity…and encourage co-operation with other European countries”.
Powell however was completely against this. He was in no way favourable for joining the EEC, as not only did it threaten the national identity of Britain, but also he knew that by entering Europe, Britain would be “under the mercy” of a European parliament; surrendering its sovereignty and having no control whatsoever over taxation and legislation, which under British right, should only be passed by the House of Commons. It was also a cause for concern to how such an integration would affect the British economy itself, as the EEC would not only affect the British balance of payments, but would also affect both exports and imports which would cause a severe strain on imported food prices entering Britain.
Overall, it is clear to see from this that Powell wasn’t a man of Internationalism, but a man of Nationalist principles and policies, which is why he did not support the Conservative manifesto on this issue. However, in contrast to Europe, he did support the 1966 manifesto on its policy towards immigration, as it explained that the Conservative party was in favour of:
“Helping immigrants already here to re-join their families in their countries of origin, or to return with their families to these countries, if they so wish”.
Powell was favourable for re-emigration, as immigrants present in this country could return to their country of origin and contribute their skills to their domestic economy. So in this sense, Powell did not undermine the Conservatives with this view, but none the less, did create a significant political outcry. It was not necessarily his approach to re-emigration which caused this, but his view on how Britain would soon be subjected to racial tension that portrayed him as a racist.
This now leads us onto the second area of this topic, being the splits Powell created with these views in his own party. When Powell made this speech in 1968, he did not know that it would create such scorn from his own party; especially with the Conservative leader Edward Heath. Heath believed that Powell:
“…could not remain a member of the Shadow Cabinet because of the inflammatory nature of his speech at Birmingham. [It was] likely to make race relations more difficult”.
It is also important to know that at this time, the 1968 Race Relation’s act was passing through the House of Commons, so it was rather unfortunate that Powell should make this speech at this time.
Not only was Powell demoralised by his own leader, but also from his own party members. Powell was never popular within the Conservative party, as he was quoted saying to the Sunday Times:
“Indeed it would be awkward…and even dangerous, to form a deep friendship in politics”.
Powell believed that it was doubtful whether there were such things as friends in politics, and so never established any relationship within his own shadow cabinet, portraying him as quite unpopular, and this was shown in the 1965 leadership race when he achieved 15 votes out of a possible 298. But his popularity status declined even further in April, as past supporters of Powell felt that his speech was inappropriate for party policy. Conservative MP Nicholas Ridley for instance (who was Powell’s sponsor in the leadership election) claimed that Powell’s views:
“…will make him lose touch with reality and the gentleness of the Englishman as a political voter and he’ll become an extremist”.
So with no real party support, no one from the Conservatives would dare justify such an opinion of “racism” in case they were either expelled by Heath himself, or submerged by an outraged media who had no sympathy for Powell’s opinions whatsoever. The Times newspaper for instance, described Powell as giving “an evil speech”, along with other media opinions branding Powell “a racialist”, “a Nazi” e.t.c. Even Labour MP’s felt that Powell’s views towards immigration were extreme. Ray Gunter (Cabinet Member for the Labour Party in 1968) claimed:
“I don’t think that Mr. Powell has a very great future in the field of politics. I also feel that the Conservative party are now in such a mood…they could only think of Mr. Powell as a major disaster for them”.
In this sense, Powell did not contribute any benefits to the Conservatives at this point, as the media, the party opposition, and the Conservatives themselves felt that Powell was destroying the image (and the support) of his party, which in the long run would have cost the Conservatives a significant number of votes in the upcoming election.
However, if anything, Powell actually gained the Conservatives support with his 1968 speech: support from a minority group of his party, and the majority of the general public.
A few members of the Shadow-Cabinet, including Cyril Osborne, Norman Pannel and Ronald Bell, believed that Powell’s ideas of nationhood were correct, and that it was his right, as a British MP, to express his views for the cause of freedom of speech. As well as this, Powell not only received numerous support from his own constituency, but also mass support from the general public. His constituency in Wolverhampton South West claimed:
“we praise his courage to express the true facts which exist in his constituency and in other parts of the country…”
so it was clear that Powell’s support was most certainly increasing, especially in London. Three days after Powell made his speech on April 12th, over 1000 Dockers marched to Westminster appalled at Powell’s victimisation from the Conservatives, with over 400 meat porters handing in a 92 page partition in support of him the next day. In addition, he also received over 120,000 letters of support in the following week, with every writer believing that UK immigration had simply ran out of control, and re-emigration was the only solution to this ever growing problem.
As well as obvious support from the National Front and the newly formed British National Party, Powell received huge support from the general public themselves…a general public which Heath was certain to vote against Powell. When national polls were conducted one month after Powell’s Birmingham speech, 74% of people (who were asked if they agree with Powell’s voluntary repatriation proposal) said they did, with only 23% saying they disagreed. Even a poll conducted on coloured immigrants (asking if they would favour further controls on immigration) resulted in 48% saying “Yes”, with only 29% saying “No”. By looking at this evidence, it is quite clear that Heath (and majority of the Conservative shadow cabinet) could not have been more wrong when they criticised Powell as a disadvantage to their support.
Richard Crossman, a Labour MP, described the public support that Powell had created across the country, explaining that although the Conservatives thought otherwise, the public were unified with Powell’s immigration views:
“Powell has stirred up the nearest thing to a mass movement since the 1930’s, stimulating a real revolt of the masses…the illiterate proletariat who have turned up in strength [have] revolted against the literate”.
Further more, two Gallup polls were undertaken shortly after Powell was excluded from the shadow cabinet. One showed that 74% of the electorate agreed with Powell’s “Rivers of blood” speech, with only 15% disagreeing, and a final 70% believing that Heath was wrong to release him from his Shadow-Cabinet in the first place. The other poll showed that 56% of the electorate intended to vote Conservative in May 1968 (compared to only 45% in January). This shows that although Powell received much accusation of racism from the media and his shadow cabinet, the nation on a whole agreed with what he said in Birmingham; that Britain was accepting far more immigrants than its society could handle, and it was therefore necessary to introduce a British Nationality Act to solve this problem, and retain Britain’s national identity.
So this shows that Powell had the support of the nation behind him, which leads us onto the next topic, being his electoral success. We can see that Powell influenced the way the public voted, by looking at the 1970 General Election (the election after Powell made his speech). The Conservatives had lost their past two general elections (in 1964 & 1966) with a decreasing majority of only 40%, while Labour where commanding a significant working class majority of nearly 48%. However, when Powell made his speech in 1968, the next general election was a surprise victory for Edward Heath, as the Tories achieved nearly 47% of the electorate vote, while Labour trailed with 43%. In terms of parliamentary seats won, the Conservatives had now gained nearly 70 seats from Labour in 1970 (compared to only 5 seats in 1964), which increased the number of Conservative MP’s elected into parliament up to 330.
So even though Heath expelled Powell from the Shadow Cabinet, these figures show that Powell actually helped Heath by gaining him the support needed to become Prime Minister. By-election figures from 1968-1970 also show that Conservative support increased by over 6.8%, with Labour support falling by a massive 17.3% during this time…again indicating that Powell made a huge influence to the way the public voted during the 1970 general election.
So overall, Powell did damage the Conservative party in some respects with his views on immigration, but in the long run, he significantly benefited them by gaining huge support from the general public, and inevitably, achieved Heath the Prime-minister-ship in 1970. It is recognisable that without Powell, the Conservatives would have possibly faced their third election defeat in a row.
But even though Powell benefited his party in this perspective, he was to change his support for the Conservatives over the issue of Europe. With Heath now in office, Europe was to be top of the Conservative agenda, as the new motto for the Tories had now become:
“Conservatives - the party of Europe”
As explained, Powell was against this idea of European unionism, as he was bound to the words of Winston Churchill, stating:
“The Conservative party stands for the absolute independence of the UK”
Powell knew that Edward Heath and his supporters were going back on the essentials for what the party stood for, and when it became conclusive that the Conservatives were fully behind this integration, Powell had no choice but to resign as MP in 1970. He was later quoted on the matter, saying:
“It would have been worth any sacrifice to continue to warn and advise against the loss of a free nation’s liberties.”
But this wasn’t the end of Powell, as in the sudden general election of 1974, he returned to parliament as an Ulster Unionist, and was to fight against the European issue not with the Conservative party, but against the Conservative party. In doing so, he stunned the nation by claiming to the public: “I have already cast my vote, and it is for Labour!”
The Conservatives however were still fighting for EEC integration, spending vast sums of government expenditure on the European campaign, which did win them the next general election in February 1974 (but only by a narrow 200,000 votes). Labour on the other hand, was fully against the idea of Europe (hence why Powell was in strong support of them). Their main policy was not to enter Europe through party opinion, but to give the public a referendum to let them decide whether the EEC would be best for Britain and its economy. With this in mind, Powell (arguably for the first time in his career) damaged the support that the Conservatives had. With enough public loyalty from his 1968 speech, he urged the public to vote Labour in the October 1974 election, explaining that European integration would affect the three most important aspects of British politics: taxation, legislation and expenditure. Powell even spoke of this to the House of Commons in February 1972, stating that:
“…it is an inherent consequence of accession to the Treaty of Rome, that this House and Parliament will lose their legislative supremacy”.
Powell made it clear that by joining with Europe, Britain would forfeit its power of taxation, its spending of this taxation, and its right to pass laws; all of which would be handed over to a European parliament and diminishing Britain’s historical liberties. And so when the election finally came around, Labour achieved a comfortable victory, partly thanks to Powell’s public persuasion. The Conservatives had lost 21 seats in the Commons, while Labour had increased their number of seats from 301 to 319, and a clear victory with over 11.4 million votes in total. This resulted in the Conservatives losing mass support from the electorate, as the 47% of the public vote they once had in 1970, had been reduced to a mere 35% in October 1974.
So in this respect, Powell was not an asset to the Conservatives, as he felt integration with the European Economic Community would have solely undermined the reason for British sovereignty. He even sided with the Tories closest rivals to fight against Heath’s proposal of a European Common Market, and so was more of an asset to the Labour party than the Conservatives themselves. However, this did show him to be the most influential politician of his time, as his views not only got the Conservatives elected in 1970, but also removed them from office in October 1974.
In conclusion, from the evidence I have presented, Powell was both an asset and a hindrance to the Conservative party from 1965-1976. Looking at his 1968 speech on immigration, Powell gained much support from the general public; not only because they agreed with his views on the matter, but also because he was the only politician to tackle such a politically sensitive issue at this time, earning him much respect and support from the public, who in return, voted for the Conservatives to be the next government in the general election of 1970.
Looking at Powell’s opinions towards Europe however, it is clear that he was a hindrance to the Conservatives, as he influenced the public to vote for the Labour party in October 1974, hence contradicting Heath’s objective to move Britain into a single economic community. This demonstrated that he was willing to support the rivals of the party he was once a member of, believing that:
“…whoever envisages the EEC in terms of political union…is misleading himself and helping to mislead others”.
It was this use of persuasion that influenced the public to vote Labour in 1974, and support the policy of the government holding a referendum before any further move was made to join in a single market with the European Union.So overall, Powell was an asset to the Conservatives, but only on policies which he favoured (such as immigration). The policy of Europe however proved Powell to be more of a hindrance to the Conservative party, showing that as well as being beneficial to the party, Powell was also very influential in damaging Conservative support, demonstrating that Powell wasn’t always an asset to the Conservatives from 1965-1976.
The first is Powell’s policies, and the question of whether or not these contradicted Conservatism during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. As he explained at an interview in 1991, there were two subjects which “he exercised his liberty of self-expression most audibly”; his view of immigration into the UK, and Britain’s integration with Europe into the European Common Market (EEC). Both of these not only created mass publicity, but also gained (and lost) support for the Conservative party.
Firstly, looking at his view on immigration, Powell was concerned about the number of post-war immigrants entering the UK, and he publicised this concern whilst speaking in Birmingham on April 12th 1968. He spoke of how British society was suffering under the huge influx of immigrants it was accepting every year, and how this was damaging the basic character of Britain in the future:
“If all immigration ended tomorrow, the rate of growth of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population…would still leave the basic character of the national danger unaffected”.
Powell also spoke of the consequences Britain would face if it continued to allow such a high number of migrants passed its borders (which was over 50,000 a year in 1968). He predicted ethnic communities within the UK using violence against their fellow citizens, which would inevitably result in the break-down of British society:
“[The immigrant communities] will organise to consolidate their members”…“agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens”, and finally “dominate the rest with legal weapons…like the Roman, I see the River Tiber foaming with much blood”.
Because of the imagery Powell used here, his speech later became known as the “Rivers of blood” speech.
Powell’s second view was of Britain entering the European Economic Community. In 1970, when parliament had approved of Britain’s entry into this, Powell spoke out in the House of Commons, firmly believing that Britain should not be apart of any other economic system other than its own. He felt that by uniting under a European Union, there was little point in having the British parliamentary system, and furthermore, it undermined the historical liberties of Britain. If Britain were to be controlled under Europe, where would the sense of patriotism be? (As Powell later said in 1971: “there is more to politics than getting the economy right”…implying that nationhood was far more important than creating a monetary union with Europe).
But even though these were Powell’s policies, both vary on how much they contradicted Conservatism in this period. By looking at the Conservative manifesto of 1968 for instance, we can see that Powell’s view towards Europe did undermine Conservative policy at this time, as it claimed the Conservatives would:
“work energetically for entry into the European Common Market at the first favourable opportunity…and encourage co-operation with other European countries”.
Powell however was completely against this. He was in no way favourable for joining the EEC, as not only did it threaten the national identity of Britain, but also he knew that by entering Europe, Britain would be “under the mercy” of a European parliament; surrendering its sovereignty and having no control whatsoever over taxation and legislation, which under British right, should only be passed by the House of Commons. It was also a cause for concern to how such an integration would affect the British economy itself, as the EEC would not only affect the British balance of payments, but would also affect both exports and imports which would cause a severe strain on imported food prices entering Britain.
Overall, it is clear to see from this that Powell wasn’t a man of Internationalism, but a man of Nationalist principles and policies, which is why he did not support the Conservative manifesto on this issue. However, in contrast to Europe, he did support the 1966 manifesto on its policy towards immigration, as it explained that the Conservative party was in favour of:
“Helping immigrants already here to re-join their families in their countries of origin, or to return with their families to these countries, if they so wish”.
Powell was favourable for re-emigration, as immigrants present in this country could return to their country of origin and contribute their skills to their domestic economy. So in this sense, Powell did not undermine the Conservatives with this view, but none the less, did create a significant political outcry. It was not necessarily his approach to re-emigration which caused this, but his view on how Britain would soon be subjected to racial tension that portrayed him as a racist.
This now leads us onto the second area of this topic, being the splits Powell created with these views in his own party. When Powell made this speech in 1968, he did not know that it would create such scorn from his own party; especially with the Conservative leader Edward Heath. Heath believed that Powell:
“…could not remain a member of the Shadow Cabinet because of the inflammatory nature of his speech at Birmingham. [It was] likely to make race relations more difficult”.
It is also important to know that at this time, the 1968 Race Relation’s act was passing through the House of Commons, so it was rather unfortunate that Powell should make this speech at this time.
Not only was Powell demoralised by his own leader, but also from his own party members. Powell was never popular within the Conservative party, as he was quoted saying to the Sunday Times:
“Indeed it would be awkward…and even dangerous, to form a deep friendship in politics”.
Powell believed that it was doubtful whether there were such things as friends in politics, and so never established any relationship within his own shadow cabinet, portraying him as quite unpopular, and this was shown in the 1965 leadership race when he achieved 15 votes out of a possible 298. But his popularity status declined even further in April, as past supporters of Powell felt that his speech was inappropriate for party policy. Conservative MP Nicholas Ridley for instance (who was Powell’s sponsor in the leadership election) claimed that Powell’s views:
“…will make him lose touch with reality and the gentleness of the Englishman as a political voter and he’ll become an extremist”.
So with no real party support, no one from the Conservatives would dare justify such an opinion of “racism” in case they were either expelled by Heath himself, or submerged by an outraged media who had no sympathy for Powell’s opinions whatsoever. The Times newspaper for instance, described Powell as giving “an evil speech”, along with other media opinions branding Powell “a racialist”, “a Nazi” e.t.c. Even Labour MP’s felt that Powell’s views towards immigration were extreme. Ray Gunter (Cabinet Member for the Labour Party in 1968) claimed:
“I don’t think that Mr. Powell has a very great future in the field of politics. I also feel that the Conservative party are now in such a mood…they could only think of Mr. Powell as a major disaster for them”.
In this sense, Powell did not contribute any benefits to the Conservatives at this point, as the media, the party opposition, and the Conservatives themselves felt that Powell was destroying the image (and the support) of his party, which in the long run would have cost the Conservatives a significant number of votes in the upcoming election.
However, if anything, Powell actually gained the Conservatives support with his 1968 speech: support from a minority group of his party, and the majority of the general public.
A few members of the Shadow-Cabinet, including Cyril Osborne, Norman Pannel and Ronald Bell, believed that Powell’s ideas of nationhood were correct, and that it was his right, as a British MP, to express his views for the cause of freedom of speech. As well as this, Powell not only received numerous support from his own constituency, but also mass support from the general public. His constituency in Wolverhampton South West claimed:
“we praise his courage to express the true facts which exist in his constituency and in other parts of the country…”
so it was clear that Powell’s support was most certainly increasing, especially in London. Three days after Powell made his speech on April 12th, over 1000 Dockers marched to Westminster appalled at Powell’s victimisation from the Conservatives, with over 400 meat porters handing in a 92 page partition in support of him the next day. In addition, he also received over 120,000 letters of support in the following week, with every writer believing that UK immigration had simply ran out of control, and re-emigration was the only solution to this ever growing problem.
As well as obvious support from the National Front and the newly formed British National Party, Powell received huge support from the general public themselves…a general public which Heath was certain to vote against Powell. When national polls were conducted one month after Powell’s Birmingham speech, 74% of people (who were asked if they agree with Powell’s voluntary repatriation proposal) said they did, with only 23% saying they disagreed. Even a poll conducted on coloured immigrants (asking if they would favour further controls on immigration) resulted in 48% saying “Yes”, with only 29% saying “No”. By looking at this evidence, it is quite clear that Heath (and majority of the Conservative shadow cabinet) could not have been more wrong when they criticised Powell as a disadvantage to their support.
Richard Crossman, a Labour MP, described the public support that Powell had created across the country, explaining that although the Conservatives thought otherwise, the public were unified with Powell’s immigration views:
“Powell has stirred up the nearest thing to a mass movement since the 1930’s, stimulating a real revolt of the masses…the illiterate proletariat who have turned up in strength [have] revolted against the literate”.
Further more, two Gallup polls were undertaken shortly after Powell was excluded from the shadow cabinet. One showed that 74% of the electorate agreed with Powell’s “Rivers of blood” speech, with only 15% disagreeing, and a final 70% believing that Heath was wrong to release him from his Shadow-Cabinet in the first place. The other poll showed that 56% of the electorate intended to vote Conservative in May 1968 (compared to only 45% in January). This shows that although Powell received much accusation of racism from the media and his shadow cabinet, the nation on a whole agreed with what he said in Birmingham; that Britain was accepting far more immigrants than its society could handle, and it was therefore necessary to introduce a British Nationality Act to solve this problem, and retain Britain’s national identity.
So this shows that Powell had the support of the nation behind him, which leads us onto the next topic, being his electoral success. We can see that Powell influenced the way the public voted, by looking at the 1970 General Election (the election after Powell made his speech). The Conservatives had lost their past two general elections (in 1964 & 1966) with a decreasing majority of only 40%, while Labour where commanding a significant working class majority of nearly 48%. However, when Powell made his speech in 1968, the next general election was a surprise victory for Edward Heath, as the Tories achieved nearly 47% of the electorate vote, while Labour trailed with 43%. In terms of parliamentary seats won, the Conservatives had now gained nearly 70 seats from Labour in 1970 (compared to only 5 seats in 1964), which increased the number of Conservative MP’s elected into parliament up to 330.
So even though Heath expelled Powell from the Shadow Cabinet, these figures show that Powell actually helped Heath by gaining him the support needed to become Prime Minister. By-election figures from 1968-1970 also show that Conservative support increased by over 6.8%, with Labour support falling by a massive 17.3% during this time…again indicating that Powell made a huge influence to the way the public voted during the 1970 general election.
So overall, Powell did damage the Conservative party in some respects with his views on immigration, but in the long run, he significantly benefited them by gaining huge support from the general public, and inevitably, achieved Heath the Prime-minister-ship in 1970. It is recognisable that without Powell, the Conservatives would have possibly faced their third election defeat in a row.
But even though Powell benefited his party in this perspective, he was to change his support for the Conservatives over the issue of Europe. With Heath now in office, Europe was to be top of the Conservative agenda, as the new motto for the Tories had now become:
“Conservatives - the party of Europe”
As explained, Powell was against this idea of European unionism, as he was bound to the words of Winston Churchill, stating:
“The Conservative party stands for the absolute independence of the UK”
Powell knew that Edward Heath and his supporters were going back on the essentials for what the party stood for, and when it became conclusive that the Conservatives were fully behind this integration, Powell had no choice but to resign as MP in 1970. He was later quoted on the matter, saying:
“It would have been worth any sacrifice to continue to warn and advise against the loss of a free nation’s liberties.”
But this wasn’t the end of Powell, as in the sudden general election of 1974, he returned to parliament as an Ulster Unionist, and was to fight against the European issue not with the Conservative party, but against the Conservative party. In doing so, he stunned the nation by claiming to the public: “I have already cast my vote, and it is for Labour!”
The Conservatives however were still fighting for EEC integration, spending vast sums of government expenditure on the European campaign, which did win them the next general election in February 1974 (but only by a narrow 200,000 votes). Labour on the other hand, was fully against the idea of Europe (hence why Powell was in strong support of them). Their main policy was not to enter Europe through party opinion, but to give the public a referendum to let them decide whether the EEC would be best for Britain and its economy. With this in mind, Powell (arguably for the first time in his career) damaged the support that the Conservatives had. With enough public loyalty from his 1968 speech, he urged the public to vote Labour in the October 1974 election, explaining that European integration would affect the three most important aspects of British politics: taxation, legislation and expenditure. Powell even spoke of this to the House of Commons in February 1972, stating that:
“…it is an inherent consequence of accession to the Treaty of Rome, that this House and Parliament will lose their legislative supremacy”.
Powell made it clear that by joining with Europe, Britain would forfeit its power of taxation, its spending of this taxation, and its right to pass laws; all of which would be handed over to a European parliament and diminishing Britain’s historical liberties. And so when the election finally came around, Labour achieved a comfortable victory, partly thanks to Powell’s public persuasion. The Conservatives had lost 21 seats in the Commons, while Labour had increased their number of seats from 301 to 319, and a clear victory with over 11.4 million votes in total. This resulted in the Conservatives losing mass support from the electorate, as the 47% of the public vote they once had in 1970, had been reduced to a mere 35% in October 1974.
So in this respect, Powell was not an asset to the Conservatives, as he felt integration with the European Economic Community would have solely undermined the reason for British sovereignty. He even sided with the Tories closest rivals to fight against Heath’s proposal of a European Common Market, and so was more of an asset to the Labour party than the Conservatives themselves. However, this did show him to be the most influential politician of his time, as his views not only got the Conservatives elected in 1970, but also removed them from office in October 1974.
In conclusion, from the evidence I have presented, Powell was both an asset and a hindrance to the Conservative party from 1965-1976. Looking at his 1968 speech on immigration, Powell gained much support from the general public; not only because they agreed with his views on the matter, but also because he was the only politician to tackle such a politically sensitive issue at this time, earning him much respect and support from the public, who in return, voted for the Conservatives to be the next government in the general election of 1970.
Looking at Powell’s opinions towards Europe however, it is clear that he was a hindrance to the Conservatives, as he influenced the public to vote for the Labour party in October 1974, hence contradicting Heath’s objective to move Britain into a single economic community. This demonstrated that he was willing to support the rivals of the party he was once a member of, believing that:
“…whoever envisages the EEC in terms of political union…is misleading himself and helping to mislead others”.
It was this use of persuasion that influenced the public to vote Labour in 1974, and support the policy of the government holding a referendum before any further move was made to join in a single market with the European Union.So overall, Powell was an asset to the Conservatives, but only on policies which he favoured (such as immigration). The policy of Europe however proved Powell to be more of a hindrance to the Conservative party, showing that as well as being beneficial to the party, Powell was also very influential in damaging Conservative support, demonstrating that Powell wasn’t always an asset to the Conservatives from 1965-1976.
posted by James.R.Skinner at 2:13 AM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home